The year 2025 marks a pivotal juncture in Syrian-Turkish relations, characterized by a significant shift from years of hostility to a “burgeoning partnership”. This transformation is primarily driven by the ousting of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 and the subsequent rise of interim President, Ahmed Al-Sharaa. Assad has been an enemy of Turkey for the past 14 years, while the latest had publicly and fully supported the armed revolution against Assad’s regime. This reality had deteriorated the relations between the two countries to a below-zero status. However, the recent evolving political landscape in Syria has turned the table upside down and opened avenues for mutual collaboration, particularly in security and economic domains.
A cornerstone of the renewed relationship is the mutual interest in changing the “threatening” reality in north and north-east Syria, where the Kurds have established an autonomous governance, totally detached from Damascus. Ankara sees this Kurdish entity a direct threat to its national security, taking in consideration the massive amount of Kurdish-nationals living in Turkey. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly stated Turkey’s resolve to prevent “terrorist organizations from finding refuge in northern Syria”, emphasizing readiness to take necessary actions to ensure regional stability. Meanwhile, Syria’s new government sees the Kurdish autonomy a weakening factor and a “direct threat” to the unity of Syria and the rule of Damascus.
In a historic visit to Ankara on February 4, 2025, President Al-Sharaa engaged in discussions with President Erdoğan, focusing on security collaboration. Reports indicate that the two leaders deliberated on a potential joint defense pact, which includes the establishment of Turkish airbases in central Syria and the provision of training for Syria’s newly structured military. Such an agreement aims to enhance military coordination and address shared security concerns, particularly the threats posed by the Islamic State (ISIS), and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Syrian affiliate, (PYD/YPG). Moreover, experts believe that this agreement is also aimed at containing the Iranian influence in the region, especially in and around Iraq.
Beyond security, economic redevelopment stands as a critical pillar of the Syrian-Turkish relations. The protracted civil war has left Syria’s infrastructure and economy in ruins, necessitating comprehensive reconstruction efforts. Damascus is in need for foreign help and investments in the recovery process, while Turkey has bluntly expressed its full readiness to support the rebuilding of devastated Syrian cities, with President Erdoğan highlighting advancements in trade, civil aviation, energy, health, and education as focal points for bilateral cooperation. A joint long-term economic cooperation between the two countries would benefit both, and it would further assert Ankara’s position as a rising regional power in both, Europe and Asia.
President Al-Sharaa has also underscored the importance of restoring commercial ties, viewing economic collaboration as a pathway to revitalize Syria’s economy. Damascus wants to learn from Ankara’s successful economic rise during the past 20 years. Turkey today is one the most powerful economies in the world, and the best of its economic experience could be applied on the Syrian case. However, the persistence of Western-imposed sanctions on Syria poses significant challenges to these efforts. Therefore, we have been witnessing a growing call for the international community to lift the sanctions, in order to facilitate Syria’s reconstruction and ensure regional stability.
Despite the positive trajectory, several challenges loom over the future of Syrian-Turkish relations. For instance, the exclusion of Kurdish-led groups from Syria’s national dialogue and constitutional talks has raised concerns about the inclusivity of the political process. This exclusion could push the Kurds to further independence and farther from Damascus government, which in its turn would complicate Ankara’s relations with Damascus. Ankara does not want the Kurds to get more autonomy but rather to return and live under Damascus rule and unite with the other Syrian people. The new Syrian government did not invite the Kurds to the National Dialogue Summit as they have not agreed yet to live under Damascus rule and they still insist on having a federal system in Syria.
Moreover, the negotiation of a joint defense pact, between Ankara and Damascus, may alter regional power dynamics. Turkey’s expanded military presence in Syria could elicit reactions from neighboring countries and global powers, such as Egypt, Russia and Israel. This is why rushing into a joint defense pact has to be lead by a careful diplomatic navigation, in order to balance interests and maintain regional harmony. In other words, Turkey might be very influential in today’s Syria but it is not the only powerful country seeking to enhance its interests in the new political reality of Syria.
The transformation in Syrian-Turkish relations in 2025 signifies a strategic realignment influenced by shifting political realities and shared security and economic interests. While opportunities for collaboration arise, the path forward requires addressing complex challenges, including political inclusivity, regional sensitivities, and the impact of international sanctions. In fact, the success of this renewed partnership will depend on sustained diplomatic engagement, mutual respect for sovereignty, and a concerted effort to foster stability in a historically turbulent region.
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