Greenland’s dissatisfaction is also due to Denmark’s slow implementation of the Arctic defense agreement presented back in February 2021. The agreement aims to improve monitoring and analysis of intelligence data and the situation in the Arctic and North Atlantic. In May 2022, Denmark and Greenland further agreed on the principles for implementing this “Arctic package.” Additionally, Greenlandic and Faroe interests were specifically mentioned in an annex to the Danish defense planning framework for 2024-2033. In January 2024, funds were allocated for drone purchases, but despite all the bureaucratic and political documents, there has been no real impact from these investments and political statements. In addition, as it turned out in May 2024, only 15 million Danish crowns out of the 1.5 billion originally planned under the February 2021 agreement were spent. These funds were used for an educational program aimed at creating a hybrid personnel reserve for the rescue services and armed forces from Greenland’s population. The Greenlanders have long demanded that Denmark involve the Inuit more actively in ensuring the security of the island, including through participation in the Sirius dog sled patrol in northeastern Greenland. However, this remains a future goal.
In November 2024, Vivian Motzfeldt, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greenland, expressed the idea of creating Greenland units similar to Sirius to cooperate in patrolling other remote areas along the island’s coastline. However, as practice has shown, even a seemingly insignificant issue such as the installation of the Greenlandic flag alongside the Danish one on the Sirius patrol sled, which has been under discussion since January 2020, has yet to be resolved and remains a topic of debate between Denmark and Greenland. It is worth noting that in the documentary about this patrol presented by Danmarks Radio in January 2023, only the Danish flag was visible in the footage.
The “billion-dollar investments” in Greenland’s defense, announced in November and December 2024, and the bipartisan negotiations on a new agreement for the Arctic, which began on January 10, 2025, within the framework of the common defense planning for 2024-2033, show how the Danish armed forces are struggling with bureaucratic and financial challenges. These negotiations are unlikely to lead to any significant results, as the main priorities for action were outlined back in 2021 but have not been fully implemented yet.
As of January 2025, the contracts for the supply of long-range drones and smaller drones for Arctic patrol vessels have not been finalized. There is still no clarity regarding the contract for the construction of a radar station on the Faroe Islands and its expected start date has been postponed to 2030.
These measures primarily involve surveillance and reconnaissance equipment rather than weapons and military hardware, so it may take even longer to adequately equip Denmark’s Arctic units.
At the same time, Denmark’s cooperation with NATO allies is currently more focused on military activities in the Baltic Sea, rather than in the North Atlantic or Arctic regions. For example, since February 2022, Bornholm has hosted military exercises three times – in May 2022, September 2023 and May 2024 – involving the deployment of missile systems on the island. These exercises have provoked protests from the Russian embassy in Denmark due to the potential threat they pose to Russia’s Baltic and Northern fleets. The missile systems, including the HIMARS and Mk70, have the capability to launch Tomahawk missiles. Senior Russian military officials have highlighted this potential threat. Anyway, in this context, the possible transfer of American missile systems to Danish Bornholm seems like a more pressing and problematic issue than the increase in the American military presence in Greenland at the moment.
One of the main reasons why the Danish military presence in the North Atlantic and Arctic is not growing as quickly as expected by the United States and NATO, is not only due to limited financial and material resources. It is also because the objectives of military planning in this region are not yet fully consolidated at the level of the whole NATO alliance.
In 2025, these objectives remain the responsibility of individual member states. This means that Denmark cannot count on military and non-military investments, such as the cost of expanding a dog sled patrol in Greenland or building new patrol ships, to fulfill its collective defense obligations within the alliance. During the next cycle of defense planning within NATO, which began with the appointment of a new political leadership in February 2023, Denmark will likely actively lobby for the inclusion of the North Atlantic and Arctic regions in the alliance’s overall military plans.
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