Between Engagement And Principle

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Keir Starmer’s visit to Beijing takes place against one of the most complex geopolitical backdrops a British prime minister has faced in decades. China’s rise as a second global superpower has been reshaping world politics for years, but the return of Donald Trump to the White House has intensified the challenge. With Washington increasingly unpredictable, Britain can no longer rely on old strategic assumptions. Engagement with China is no longer optional – but neither is caution.

For much of the post-cold war era, the UK’s China policy was filtered through its alliance with the United States. When Washington hardened its stance, London followed; when relations thawed, Britain adjusted accordingly. That framework is now fractured. Trump’s open disdain for Nato, his willingness to weaponise tariffs against allies and rivals alike, and his broader contempt for multilateralism have scrambled the strategic calculus for European democracies. In this environment, Britain must think more independently, even as it remains tied to the US for security.

China is impossible to ignore. It accounts for nearly a fifth of global GDP and produces more manufactured goods than all G7 countries combined. Its artificial intelligence sector is the only one that seriously rivals America’s, and it dominates green energy technologies at a moment when the current US administration is sceptical of climate policy. From electric vehicles to solar panels, China is shaping the industries of the future. Refusing dialogue with such a power would be economically irrational and diplomatically self-defeating.

Starmer is right to argue that the UK has become an outlier in Europe by allowing eight years to pass without a prime ministerial visit to Beijing. France, Germany and other EU states have all maintained high-level contacts, even while voicing deep concerns. Claims from Conservative figures that any visit amounts to a “kowtow” to Xi Jinping substitute moral posturing for serious strategy. Simply listing Beijing’s abuses does not amount to a workable foreign policy.

Yet the dangers of engagement are real and substantial. China under Xi Jinping is more authoritarian, more assertive and more intrusive than at any point in recent decades. Civil liberties in Hong Kong have been systematically dismantled. Jimmy Lai, a British citizen and pro-democracy media owner, remains imprisoned. The repression of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, which some Labour MPs previously described as genocide, continues. Beijing’s tacit support for Vladimir Putin has helped sustain Russia’s war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, British intelligence agencies warn of aggressive espionage and the intimidation of dissidents within the UK’s own Chinese diaspora.

Starmer has promised to “raise what needs to be raised” with President Xi, the familiar diplomatic phrase that allows sensitive issues to be acknowledged without derailing talks. More importantly, he has insisted that Britain will not trade security for economic access. This principle is sound, but its application will be tested quickly. China has a long track record of linking market access to political compliance, and of retaliating against countries that cross its red lines.

The tension between values and interests is not unique to China policy, but it is especially stark here. Britain presents itself as a defender of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Engaging closely with an authoritarian state that violates those principles inevitably creates accusations of hypocrisy. This does not mean disengagement is the answer. Diplomacy is not endorsement. But it does mean that engagement must be disciplined, transparent and anchored in clear red lines.

Starmer’s record suggests a tendency to downplay conflicts of interest rather than confront them openly. He has argued that closer ties with the EU and warmer relations with Trump’s America can be pursued simultaneously, despite the obvious tensions between those goals. With China, the contradiction is sharper. Economic cooperation with Beijing may bring investment and growth, but it also risks entanglement with a state that uses economic leverage for political ends.

The challenge for Starmer is therefore not whether to engage, but how. A credible China policy requires diversification as well as dialogue: reducing reliance on Chinese supply chains, protecting critical infrastructure, strengthening cyber-security and coordinating closely with European partners. Engagement should be selective, focused on areas of mutual benefit such as climate, global health and regulated trade, while remaining firm on security and human rights.

Ultimately, Starmer’s Beijing visit is a test of political maturity rather than ideological purity. In a world where the US can no longer be assumed to act as a stabilising force, middle powers like the UK must navigate a more crowded and contested landscape. Engagement with China is necessary, but it must be conducted with clear eyes and steady nerves.

If Starmer succeeds, Britain can show that it is possible to talk to Beijing without surrendering principle or security. If he fails, the risk is not just economic dependence, but a gradual erosion of credibility at home and abroad.

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