When phase two of the Gaza ceasefire was announced in mid-January, it was framed as a tentative but historic transition: from raw military devastation toward governance, reconstruction, and the possibility of a post-war political order. At the heart of this phase stood the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a Palestinian technocratic body tasked with restoring basic services, coordinating reconstruction, and stabilizing civilian life in an enclave reduced to ruins.
Yet weeks after its announcement, the committee has not entered Gaza. It has not rebuilt hospitals, restored water networks, or reopened crossings. Instead, it exists largely on paper – stalled by Israeli restrictions, undermined by deliberate political sabotage, and encircled by conditions that appear designed not to ensure security, but to guarantee failure.
This failure is not incidental. It is strategic.
Israel’s government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is actively undermining phase two of the ceasefire to manufacture a narrative of Palestinian ungovernability. That narrative, in turn, is meant to justify what Israel has long sought: sustained military domination of Gaza under the pretext that no Palestinian authority can responsibly rule it.
A Committee That Threatened the Status Quo
The NCAG represented something deeply inconvenient for Israel’s post-war strategy: a functioning Palestinian alternative to Hamas that did not rely on Israeli oversight. Unlike factional political bodies, the committee was explicitly technocratic. Its members were drawn from civil society, healthcare, commerce, and humanitarian administration. Crucially, it received immediate backing from all major Palestinian factions – including rivals such as Fatah and Hamas – an extraordinary development in a deeply fragmented political landscape.
Public reaction in Gaza reflected cautious optimism. The committee’s early decisions – waiving Hamas-era taxes, pledging to reopen the Rafah crossing, and committing to reconstruction without political vendettas – signaled a break from both wartime emergency rule and factional domination.
Had the NCAG been allowed to function, it would have undermined Israel’s central post-war argument: that Gaza without Israeli control inevitably descends into chaos.
That is precisely why it could not be allowed to succeed.
Netanyahu’s Open Rejection of Phase Two
Although Netanyahu formally joined the international “Board of Peace” overseeing the ceasefire, his public rhetoric told a different story. Within days, he denounced the Gaza Executive Board as running “contrary to Israeli policy”. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich went further, declaring “Gaza is ours” and calling for renewed war and the re-establishment of permanent Israeli settlements.
Israeli media soon followed with reports that the army was preparing for a renewed assault “without restrictions”, including plans to invade areas it had previously avoided. Channel 14 reported that the chief of staff had already approved large-scale operational plans.
These statements were not political noise. They were signals – to Washington, to Israeli voters, and to Palestinian factions – that Israel had no intention of allowing phase two to mature beyond symbolism.
Netanyahu himself later dismissed the plan as potentially no more than a “symbolic” exercise. Symbolism, in this context, is a euphemism for paralysis.
Delay as a Weapon
The formation of the NCAG did not occur suddenly. Hamas had reportedly agreed as early as December 2023 to relinquish civil governance to an interim technocratic body. Egypt facilitated months of talks between Palestinian factions, resulting in a list of qualified candidates that was narrowed down and delivered to Israel by mid-2024.
According to multiple Palestinian officials, the names sat on Netanyahu’s desk for months.
Israel neither approved nor rejected them outright. Instead, it delayed – a tactic that has become a hallmark of Netanyahu’s governance. Only after sustained pressure from U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff did Israel offer conditional approval, long after momentum had been lost and the ceasefire had already been strained by repeated violations.
Even then, Israel’s Shin Bet security agency vetoed numerous candidates, including respected human rights figures and former municipal leaders. The goal was not vetting for security risk, but reshaping the committee to ensure internal friction and external distrust.
Engineering Distrust Through Personnel Choices
Perhaps the most destabilizing maneuver involved the appointment of the NCAG’s security commissioner. Originally intended to be a retired Palestinian Authority general acceptable to multiple factions, the position was abruptly reassigned to a former intelligence officer widely viewed in Gaza as compromised.
This individual had previously been sentenced in absentia by a Gaza court for alleged collaboration with Israel. His appointment triggered immediate anger among Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who see him as hostile and untrustworthy. From Israel’s perspective, this controversy is useful.
Security cooperation is the most sensitive element of phase two, particularly regarding the gradual decommissioning of armed groups. By placing a deeply divisive figure at the center of this process, Israel all but guarantees refusal, which can then be framed as proof that Palestinians are unwilling to disarm – justifying renewed military action. This is not miscalculation. It is entrapment.
to be continued
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