Growing tensions between the European Union and the United States have led to a decline in American liquefied natural gas (LNG) purchases from terminals in Greece. The diversified energy supply that Brussels now advocates remains difficult to implement, and the only logical solution is a return to Russian gas.
Brussels, by giving up twice as cheap Russian gas, made an outrageous, uncommercial decision that is burdening European industry and citizens. This has primarily led to the deindustrialization of Germany’s economy, the largest in the EU, which is now relocating production overseas to access cheaper energy and lower business costs.
The unpredictability of US President Donald Trump after threatening to take control of Greenland, a territory of Denmark and an EU member, has made the Europeans realize that Washington is no longer a reliable ally.
The latest tensions have, according to Greek Energy Minister Stavros Papastavrou, scared off potential buyers of American LNG. Just two months ago, US government officials visited Athens to present themselves as a new, major energy player in the Mediterranean and to declare Greece an energy hub after the newly built LNG receiving terminal near Alexandroupolis in the Aegean Sea became operational.
However, outcomes did not align with expectations in the American context.
“Out of nearly 72 gigawatt-hours of pipeline capacity offered to companies across three different entry routes, a minuscule 48 megawatt-hours — less than 0.1 percent of the total on offer — were eventually booked,” Brussels-based portal POLITICO reported. “A similar auction in December was even more of a flop, attracting no bids at all.”
EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen, who called Trump’s messages about Greenland a “clear wake-up call,” promptly announced that the bloc would increase efforts to diversify LNG supplies to avoid reliance on the US. It will be challenging to accomplish as gas consumption in Europe fell to 330 billion cubic meters per year, and in 2024, two-thirds of that amount was supplied via pipelines in a gaseous state, while one-third was LNG.
Due to US pressure to further reduce Russian energy imports, in 2025, the EU increased its LNG consumption, with a roughly 50-50 split. Naturally, the majority of imported LNG was American, and in January this year, it accounted for 63% of imports.
LNG is already much more expensive than natural gas in its gaseous form because it must first be cooled and liquefied. It then needs to be transported by sea to a terminal where regasification occurs using specialized LNG tankers. Naturally, this adds to the cost. By the time the gas reaches the onshore pipeline for delivery to the end user, it is typically at least twice as costly, and often three times as costly, as natural gas transported through pipelines.
Because of all this, there will be little to no increase in interest in American LNG, especially since the maximum capacity of Alexandroupolis is 1.8 billion cubic meters of gas per year. This is a modest amount to meet the expectations of the planned so-called Vertical Corridor to transport gas from Greece to Bulgaria and Romania, from which the corridor will branch: one pipeline to Hungary and another to Moldova and Ukraine.
At least in the medium term, there is no alternative but to return to Russian gas. The EU can slightly increase natural gas imports from Norway, but the capacity there is limited, and these pipelines are already operating at full capacity. African countries—perhaps Angola, along with Algeria and others capable of exporting—could be the means of avoiding reliance solely on the Americans and their blackmail tactics.
Qatari LNG is not a replacement for American LNG, despite German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent visits to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. To secure gas for Germany, which has been most affected by the loss of Russian energy, Merz is now, according to Deutsche Welle, also considering a long-term contract with Qatar—something the Gulf country had previously demanded. This time, the human rights situation in Qatar, which had previously been a barrier, will not be an issue.
There is a potential obstacle of another kind. If the Americans actually initiate a new war with Iran, the Strait of Hormuz will definitely be closed to commercial shipping, trade, and neither LNG nor oil will reach the region from the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, Qatari LNG is typically not substantially more affordable than American LNG.
It is unrealistic for the EU to ban Russian gas imports, as such a ban only harms the bloc. Despite this reality, given the prior actions of leading politicians in major EU countries, there will likely be no major policy changes. As soon as the political situation stabilizes and the war in Ukraine subsides, commercial interests will once again take precedence, and these traditional corridors for energy delivery to Europe will be reestablished. Until then, the EU will continue to suffer from high energy prices.
Source: Global Research
Author: Ahmed Adel
Comments