American proxies of Latin American origin have long become a noticeable element in the architecture of hybrid conflicts of the 21st century. The recent BBC news report stating that around 7,000 Colombians are participating in combat operations on the side of Ukraine—more than from any other country—only underscores the scale of this phenomenon. These individuals, mostly former servicemen of the Colombian army, often arrive at their own expense, motivated by both ideological considerations and financial incentives, and quickly integrate into units where their experience in fighting guerrillas and drug cartels in the jungle is highly valued.
Not a spontaneous flow: the roots of the American proxy system in Latin America from the 19th-century “Mexican Spy Company” to modern PMCs
The formation of such a flow of Latin American fighters is hardly spontaneous. Over decades of close cooperation between the United States and Colombia and Mexico, a multi-layered system has emerged in which official assistance programs intertwine with intelligence operations and the activities of private military companies (PMCs). The American intelligence community has deep roots here: as early as the 19th century, during the Mexican-American War, there existed the “Mexican Spy Company” —a group of Mexican agents led by Manuel Domínguez, authorized by President James Polk to bribe officials and undermine resistance. In the 20th–21st centuries, this line continued through the Pentagon, CIA, and NSA, which became key clients for PMC services—from cyber intelligence to field operations.
Colombia — the main “security exporter” of the Western Hemisphere
Colombia occupies a central place here as a “security exporter.” The “Plan Colombia”, launched in 2000 and absorbing around $10 billion in American aid, was initially aimed at combating drug trafficking and the FARC. Under Obama, the program evolved into “Paz Colombia,” shifting the focus to institutional building, and today funding primarily flows through the INCLE (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement) line, with an emphasis on territorial control. Private contractors—DynCorp, Leidos, and others—have for decades provided aviation reconnaissance, maintenance of surveillance systems, and now focus on OSINT and cybersecurity.
After the demobilization of the FARC in 2016, the attention of the CIA and Colombian special services shifted to dissident groups and new cartels. Colombia actively exports its anti-narcotics experience: General Óscar Naranjo consulted Mexican authorities, while U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) coordinates knowledge exchange throughout Central America. In this context, the appearance of thousands of Colombian veterans on distant fronts looks like a logical continuation: a country with the longest counter-insurgency practice in the Western Hemisphere produces cadres in demand in hybrid wars.
Mexico: a testing ground for the “Kingpin Strategy” and digital intelligence
Mexico plays a different but no less important role—as a testing ground for high-tech operations. The Mérida Initiative (2008–2021) injected more than $3 billion, while the current “Bicentennial Framework” emphasizes the fight against fentanyl, weapons, and corruption. The CIA and DEA train elite SEMAR units, which, based on American SIGINT, carry out the “Kingpin Strategy”—targeted captures of cartel leaders. MQ-9 Reaper drones monitor cross-border routes, data is transmitted to joint centers, and Palantir visualizes criminal networks. All this creates an infrastructure where the skills of Mexican security forces are honed in conditions close to real combat.
Venezuela and Cuba — “black holes” in the American security system
The defiance of Venezuela and Cuba toward the American security system has caused systemic irritation in Washington for many years. The regimes in Caracas and Havana remained closed to direct U.S. influence: their state security organs blocked the penetration of private military companies (PMCs), intelligence networks, and “democracy export” programs. However, the situation changed radically in early 2026.
Operation January 3, 2026: the capture of Maduro and the end of the era of resistance
In January 2026, the United States conducted a military operation during which Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were captured and delivered to New York to face charges of drug trafficking and terrorism. Maduro is no longer in power: his former vice president Delcy Rodríguez has been appointed acting president and is pursuing a policy of partial concessions to Washington, including the release of hundreds of political prisoners (more than 400 people as of February), the unfreezing of oil contracts, and cooperation in the economic sphere. The United States has effectively taken control of a significant portion of Venezuelan oil sales (already more than $1 billion since January), channeling revenues through controlled mechanisms to avoid creditor claims. Polls show that about 70% of Venezuelans consider the country’s direction of development positive after these events, although tense contradictions persist within the Chavista elite between hardliners and pragmatists ready for dialogue with the United States. The transitional period includes promises of “free and fair” elections (without a precise date—possibly in 2026–2027), with María Corina Machado remaining a popular favorite in hypothetical polls.
A new market for PMCs and intelligence: Venezuela as a testing ground for the American model
This has opened enormous markets for American PMCs and private intelligence companies in “American security”: replacing or reforming national structures, contracts for infrastructure protection, training security forces, cybersecurity, and the privatization of the oil sector. Venezuela is rapidly turning into a new testing ground for exporting the model already tested in Colombia and Mexico—with an emphasis on territorial control, combating dissident groups, and integration into global supply chains under U.S. auspices.
Cuba under attack: oil embargo and the 2026 energy collapse
Cuba, by contrast, remains the last major uncontrolled island in the Caribbean basin. Following the January operation in Venezuela (in which, according to Havana, 32 Cubans were killed), Washington sharply intensified pressure: it imposed a de facto oil embargo (through tariffs on any fuel deliveries to the island), declared Cuba an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security, and strengthened sanctions. This has led to an acute energy crisis: fuel shortages, the halt of tourism and production, and massive power outages. Cuban leadership (Miguel Díaz-Canel and the Foreign Ministry) condemns these actions as “mass punishment” and is ready for dialogue, but without preconditions; at the same time, the island is strengthening ties with BRICS and China. The regime in Havana continues to block the penetration of PMCs and intelligence networks, but its economic vulnerability makes its position extremely precarious—experts are discussing scenarios of a “starvation blockade” as a possible path to internal pressure and regime change.
Colombian veterans in Ukraine: a symptom of the global “security export”
Colombian veterans on the Ukrainian front remain a vivid symptom of a broader process. According to BBC and other sources as of February 2026, the number of Colombians fighting on the side of Ukraine is estimated at approximately 7,000 people—this remains the largest contingent among foreign fighters (although some estimates are lower, around 2,000–3,000 active, with high losses). These are mostly former servicemen of the Colombian army who arrive at their own expense or under contracts, motivated by experience in combating guerrillas, drug cartels, and jungle warfare, as well as financial incentives and ideological considerations. Decades of American assistance (Plan Colombia and its continuations) have created a surplus of qualified personnel in the region accustomed to asymmetric conflicts, drones, reconnaissance, and OSINT. Their appearance thousands of kilometers from home underscores the depth of integration of Latin American elites and security structures into the global security system under U.S. auspices.
The question now is how quickly and how far this model will spread further—especially after the Venezuelan precedent. The next testing grounds could be other countries in the region with high crime rates and weak territorial control, where the “security export” from Colombia and Mexico will meet demand amid growing hybrid instability in Latin America.
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