For nearly two decades, the idea of a comprehensive EU-India trade agreement hovered somewhere between ambition and inertia. Talks were launched in 2007, stalled repeatedly, and eventually abandoned, becoming a symbol of how difficult it was to reconcile Europe’s regulatory ambitions with India’s protectionist instincts. Yet recently, after a sudden burst of diplomatic momentum, Brussels and Delhi have unveiled what European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen called the “mother of all deals”. The speed of its conclusion raises an obvious question: why now?
The answer lies less in economics than in geopolitics. The EU-India trade deal is not merely about cars, wine, software or services. It is a sign that a post-US-centric world order is no longer a distant theory but a process already under way.
When the negotiations first began, the global context was very different. The US was still the uncontested anchor of the liberal international order. China’s rise was rapid but not yet framed as a systemic rival. Europe assumed transatlantic relations were a permanent strategic constant. India, newly a trillion-dollar economy, was still cautiously opening itself to global markets. Under those conditions, prolonged negotiations felt tolerable. Strategic urgency was lacking.
That complacency has evaporated. The decisive catalyst was Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the shockwaves that followed. Even before his second inauguration, Trump unsettled Europe by reviving the idea of US ownership of Greenland, signalling that territorial sovereignty was no longer sacrosanct, even among allies. On his first day back in office, he imposed sweeping tariffs on Canada and Mexico, soon followed by punitive “liberation day” tariffs on 90 countries worldwide. India was hit particularly hard, facing tariffs of up to 50%, partly as punishment for importing discounted Russian oil.
Europe, too, found itself in the crosshairs. When several Nato members sent small troop contingents to Greenland, the US responded not diplomatically but economically, wielding tariffs as a weapon. In public opinion surveys across Europe, the US is now increasingly viewed not as an unreliable partner, but as a potential threat. The transatlantic relationship, once assumed to be unshakeable, has entered a phase of profound uncertainty.
It is in this context that the EU-India deal must be understood. What finally pushed negotiations across the finish line was not competition with China, but fear of coercion from Washington. “De-risking” and “decoupling” are back in European policy debates, only this time the target is America rather than Beijing. Supply chains, digital infrastructure, energy security and even software platforms are being reassessed through the lens of strategic autonomy. France’s decision to restrict the use of US video-conferencing tools by government officials may seem symbolic, but it reflects a deeper shift: Europe no longer assumes that dependence on American systems is politically neutral.
The EU-India agreement fits squarely into this reorientation. Economically, it brings together nearly two billion consumers and roughly a quarter of global GDP. India agrees to open parts of its domestic market, particularly in manufacturing and services, while European exporters gain improved access for automobiles, alcohol and high-value goods. For India’s expanding middle class, European products become more affordable; for Europe, India offers a vast alternative market at a time when relations with both China and the US are strained.
Strategically, however, the deal goes far beyond trade. It is embedded in a comprehensive agenda that includes defence cooperation, security dialogue, research, mobility and a shared commitment to multilateral institutions. As the US increasingly retreats into a western-hemisphere focus under what some describe as a “Donroe doctrine”, the Indo-Pacific is becoming more open to European engagement. India, long wary of formal alliances, finds in the EU a partner that offers cooperation without overt domination.
This agreement is also part of a broader global pattern. The EU has recently concluded a long-negotiated deal with the Mercosur bloc in South America, despite political resistance. India has signed trade agreements with the UK and New Zealand within months. Across regions, states are actively hedging, weaving denser networks of economic and strategic ties to reduce dependence on any single power. Multipolarity, once a slogan favoured mainly in the global south, is becoming an operational reality.
Of course, obstacles remain. Ratification processes are slow, domestic lobbies will resist, and some agreements may stall or be diluted. Yet the direction of travel is clear. The world is reorganising itself not through dramatic ruptures, but through cumulative, pragmatic adjustments. Each new deal slightly weakens the gravitational pull of the old US-centric system.
The symbolism surrounding the EU-India summit underscored this shift. For the first time, EU leaders were guests of honour at India’s Republic Day celebrations, watching military parades and elaborate pageantry. The images projected confidence and warmth at a moment when Europe itself has been mired in anxiety about war, energy and economic stagnation. They suggested not a retreat from global engagement, but a re-balancing of it.
“America first” increasingly looks like “America alone”. That does not mean the US is irrelevant, nor that its power has vanished. But it does mean that others are preparing for a world in which Washington is no longer the predictable centre of gravity. The EU-India trade deal is one of the clearest signals yet that this transition is already under way.
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