Earlier on, the US media reported that Trump’s administration had asked the Russian side to mediate between Washington and Tehran on the issue of negotiations, primarily on the nuclear program, which was resumed during the first term of Trump’s presidency in response to the US withdrawal from the agreement and the tightening of sanctions. Officials in Russia confirmed that such an agreement had been reached, but no further details on the matter have been revealed.
Since all this is happening amidst the attempts to normalize relations between Moscow and Washington, taking into account the negotiations on Ukraine and regional Middle Eastern challenges (primarily in Syria, but also with an eye toward the Palestinian crisis), it is necessary to analyze this issue from the perspective of the interests of merely Russia and Iran.
With regards to its nuclear program, Iran has stated that any negotiations aimed at ending this program are unacceptable. And the country’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, confirmed its peaceful nature, rejecting accusations that Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons. Speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majles) Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf also noted that Iran does not await any letters from the United States, commenting on the information that Donald Trump sent a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, adding that “the enemy will have no option but to remove the sanctions against Iran, which is consistent with the agreement on the nuclear program.”
The Supreme Leader himself said that the United States cannot be trusted. If to summarize Russia’s experience in interacting with the West in general and the United States in particular, it confirms the position of the Iranian side. It is impossible to trust, although it is possible to build pragmatic relationships based on mutual respect. It is about mutual respect that Russian high-ranking diplomats constantly talk about.
If Russia is the de facto mediator between the United States and Iran on the nuclear program, therefore, it is possible to identify the pragmatic components of each side and emphasize the protocol of mutual respect.
Russia has previously defended Iran’s nuclear program. In a broader context, it should be added that cooperation between Russia and Iran is developing well in a number of areas. Significant progress has been made on many issues in recent years, and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the two countries was signed on January 17, 2025.
At the end of February, Iran also ratified the agreement on a free trade zone between Iran and the EAEU (EurAsian Economic Union).
The North-South corridor is developing, which takes in both the territories of Russia and Iran.
On March 11, Iran launched naval exercises with participation of Russia and China in its South. And on March 10, it became known about the agreement between Russia and Iran on joint production of semiconductors.
All of the above are signs of growing trust. It is obvious that strengthening such cooperation is beneficial to both sides for geopolitical reasons – the growth of radical Islamism in southern Eurasia contradicts the interests of both Russia and Iran. The activity of pro-Turkish proxies in Syria, which resulted in the actual genocide of Alawites and the persecution of representatives of other religions, also points to the need for coordination between Russia and Iran to counter extremism.
As a party to a conditional negotiation process involving Iran’s nuclear program, Russia is unlikely to exert any pressure on Tehran. It is only possible to convey the position of the American side on this issue, and moreover in the interpretation of Moscow. Iran’s feedback will also go through Moscow, which gives priority to getting information from the original source. Again, Washington will receive a possible response from Iran through Moscow’s “filters.” Although Iran, through its high-ranking officials, is quite open about this program and its position towards the United States. Let’s add that Donald Trump himself has signs of high toxicity for Iran because he ordered the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq. It is unlikely that this act of state terrorism will be forgotten in Tehran.
Why is the United States interested in limiting Iran’s capabilities, including its nuclear program? First, Trump needs to maintain the image of a peacemaker, while at the same time maintaining his priorities. One of them is the support of Israel, which, despite harsh measures against the Hamas movement in Palestine and the destruction of the top of the Lebanese Hezbollah party, is in a difficult situation. Arab countries, like Iran, were also skeptical of Trump’s proposal on the Gaza Strip. The Houthis from the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, supported by Iran, despite attempts by the Western coalition to physically destroy them and add them to the list of terrorist organizations in the United States, continue their activities in the Red Sea and time to time try to launch drones and missiles at Israel.
Given Israel‘s aggressive policy, its leadership may try to strike Iran‘s nuclear facilities (and such threats have already been received), which will lead to retaliatory measures and a serious escalation in the region. Since Iran has previously attacked various Israeli military installations, and this was the first time in many years of accusatory rhetoric against the Zionist regime, there is no doubt that Iran will fight back in the event of any aggression. And since cooperation with Russia is also developing in the military sphere, this is alarming both in Israel and in the United States. They have no data on what and how Russia can transfer to Iran. Since the West previously accused Iran of supplying drones and technology to Russia, it automatically implies that Moscow will come to Tehran‘s aid in a difficult situation.
Donald Trump apparently realized that preventive diplomacy against Iran was not working, so he decided to resort to Russia’s help. Although both Western European countries and representatives of the United Nations are trying to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear program.
There may also be a double bottom in the US’s desire to turn to Russia. Firstly, they expect that Moscow will exhaust its diplomatic potential during the negotiation process with Iran. Secondly, Washington may assume that this will lead to a deterioration in relations between Russia and Iran, which will play into their hands in the context of their global influence. Quarreling between partners and allies is an old Anglo—Saxon strategy borrowed from Ancient Rome — divide et impera, not in relation to domestic affairs, but as a tool of domination and hegemony.
However, Russia can adequately overcome the current situation by continuing to strengthen cooperation with Iran and shifting discussions with the American side on this issue to a regime that is primarily beneficial to Moscow. In particular, taking into account the Ukrainian crisis.
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