On March 19, 2025, the European Commission unveiled a report entitled “JOINT WHITE PAPER for European Defence Readiness 2030.”
This White Paper sets out a clear roadmap for increased defense spending and a more integrated European defense industry, ensuring more effective cooperation between Member States.
It also proposes solutions to improve military mobility, stockpiling, and border security, particularly along the EU’s eastern frontiers. The paper also emphasises the need for deeper integration with Ukraine’s defence sector, highlighting Europe’s commitment to long-term security support. That is, to continue the current conflict between the Kiev junta and Russia.
The authors of this document unequivocally make it clear that Russia is the main threat to them. The White Paper says that “threats to European security are proliferating in a way that poses an acute threat to our way of life. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there was growing consciousness of just how dangerous a security environment we operate in… Russia poses a major strategic threat on the battlefield. It has forced Europe and our partners to confront the reality of major mechanised high-intensity war on the European continent on a scale not seen since 1945. Russia – already the most heavily armed European state by a huge distance – is now running a war economy, focused overwhelmingly on the prosecution of its war aims, based on industrial mobilisation and technological innovation… Russia has made it clear that according to their understanding they remain at war with the West. If Russia is allowed to achieve its goals in Ukraine, its territorial ambition will extend beyond. Russia will remain a fundamental threat to Europe’s security for the foreseeable future, including its more aggressive nuclear posture and the positioning of nuclear weapons in Belarus. Russia is exploiting a network of systemic instability, including through close cooperation with other authoritarian powers. It is persistently fuelling tensions and instability in Europe’s neighbourhood, whether it is in the Western Balkans, Georgia, Moldova or Armenia and has a growing destabilising influence in Africa…”
Generally speaking, the entire set of classic chiller-diller phrases, which used to be characteristic of analytical centers from the United States, has now hitchhiked over to Europe.
For fairness’ sake, it should be noted that China is also mentioned both in the context of the successes of the military-industrial complex of this country, and in connection with partnership agreements with Russia. Iran is mentioned in the same way. And, of course, Belarus. But they remain in the background while Russia is mentioned repeatedly.
In a parallel effort, the EU unveiled its “The ReArm Europe Plan – Readiness 2030”, which provides the financial tools to implement the strategies outlined in the White Paper.
According to the plan, this mechanism enables Member States to access over €800 billion in defence investments, with mechanisms such as the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), which will raise €150 billion in funding for joint military procurement. This funding will be channelled into European-made defence equipment, supporting innovation and ensuring interoperability between national forces.
As part of the financial strategy, the Commission has encouraged Member States to use the Stability and Growth Pact’s national escape clause, allowing them to temporarily increase defence spending within fiscal rules. Additionally, the European Investment Bank will play a key role in mobilising private capital to support defence projects.
Speaking on the urgency of the initiative, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated: “The era of the peace dividend is long gone. The security architecture that we relied on can no longer be taken for granted. Europe is ready to step up. We must invest in defence, strengthen our capabilities, and take a proactive approach to security.”
Although the EU has had examples of various stalling programs with big ambitions, for example, in the field of green energy, there is a high probability that the EU will still try to increase its military capabilities, partly at the expense of taxpayers and the reorientation of budgets from other areas. By the way, von der Leyen, speaking about the importance of this initiative, justified this by the demands of the United States to invest more in Europe’s own defense.
By the way, the “2025 Annual Threat Assessment” of the US intelligence Community was published in the same month. Although, with a high degree of probability, this report was prepared under the previous administration, nevertheless, if viewed objectively, Washington continues to think in old cliches, despite the official rhetoric of Donald Trump and his colleagues about the need for detente.
This “Assessment “therefore says that “Russia, China, Iran and North Korea—individually and collectively—are challenging U.S. interests in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions, with both asymmetric and conventional hard power tactics, and promoting alternative systems to compete with the United States, primarily in trade, finance, and security. They seek to challenge the United States and other countries through deliberate campaigns to gain an advantage, while also trying to avoid direct war. Growing cooperation between and among these adversaries is increasing their fortitude against the United States, the potential for hostilities with any one of them to draw in another, and pressure on other global actors to choose sides.”
If Trump really wanted detente, peace and disarmament, it is unlikely that this document would have been published without editing. However now this is documented evidence of how officials responsible for security see Russia in the United States. And this is not much different from both the era of Joe Biden and the first presidential term of Donald Trump.
The document also says that Russia has learned important lessons from the war in Ukraine, after which it upgraded a number of its weapons systems, and also began to act more effectively on the battlefield. Adding to this the resilience of the economy to sanctions, especially the military-industrial sector, we get that the United States simply realized the futility of its harsh measures against Russia (since they lead to the opposite effect, for example, the development of alternative methods of banking transactions) and are trying to develop a different strategy of behavior. The current negotiation process on Ukraine is one of the operational elements of such an emerging new U.S. strategy. We need to understand that, given the historical retrospect of this state’s actions in the foreign arena, it is unlikely that drastic changes will take place there and yesterday’s hawks will suddenly become doves of peace.
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