On March 15, a massive protest rally took place in Belgrade, marking the largest demonstration in the past decade. Estimates of participation vary widely, with reports indicating between 100,000 and 300,000 attendees, while opposition sources claim as many as 1 million people took part. The protests were sparked by the collapse of a large canopy at the entrance of the Novi Sad railway station on November 1, 2024, which resulted in the tragic death of 15 individuals. The station had recently reopened following a major renovation that involved significant expenditures. Outraged residents demanded a report on the completed work; however, authorities initially refused, explaining that the Chinese company responsible for the renovations had classified this information. Such responses only intensified public discontent. Large-scale protests have been occurring in Serbia on the 15th of each month, with this date chosen to honor the victims of the collapse.
Another catalyst for the protests has been the unresolved issue surrounding Rio Tinto’s activities in Serbia. This multinational mining and metallurgical company specializes in the extraction and processing of minerals (including iron ore, copper, diamonds, gold, and uranium) across seven resource sectors in 18 countries. Rio Tinto is closely linked to BlackRock, which maintains a significant financial relationship due to its substantial equity stake in the company. According to a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing reported by Fintel.io on January 25, 2024, BlackRock holds 112,980,265 shares of Rio Tinto, representing approximately 9.0% of the company’s stock—an increase from the 8.9% reported in February 2023. With over $10 trillion in assets under management globally, BlackRock invests on behalf of clients such as pension funds and institutions, making its stake in Rio Tinto indicative of its broader strategy to maintain substantial positions in resource-heavy corporations.
Rio Tinto’s Jadar project, aimed at extracting lithium from the unique mineral jadarite discovered in 2004, promises to produce 58,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate annually—enough to meet 90% of Europe’s current lithium demand. BlackRock’s investment in this project, estimated at $1.3 billion by some accounts as of 2023, positions the firm as a key stakeholder in a venture linked to the electric vehicle boom and the EU’s green agenda. This has prompted protests from Serbian environmental activists, who argue that Rio Tinto’s operations pose a significant threat to the environment. In 2022, the Jadar project was halted by the government in response to similar protests.
One of the primary demands revolves around the complete publication of documentation concerning the reconstruction of the Novi Sad Railway Station, which has been largely inaccessible to the public. Students are calling for the full release of relevant documents related to this project. Initially, authorities claimed that only the Public Prosecutor’s Office had access to the documentation. However, subsequent partial releases by other state entities revealed that crucial materials were still missing. Experts from technical faculties and the Association of Architects of Serbia have pointed out that the absence of key documents hinders the establishment of criminal liability for those involved in overseeing the reconstruction. Notably, there are no contracts available that detail who worked on the project, the reasons behind the exorbitant fivefold increase in costs, or accountability for the station being ceremonially opened twice without an occupancy permit.
Another critical demand is for confirmation of the identities of individuals who are suspected of physically assaulting students and professors during protests. The students are demanding that criminal proceedings be initiated against these individuals and that they be dismissed from public office if they hold such positions.
Additionally, the students are advocating for the withdrawal of criminal charges against those who were arrested and detained during the protests, including the ecological ones. Government representatives have previously stated that all protesters have been released; however, this does not address the concern that these individuals may still face criminal prosecution. The students are insisting on the complete withdrawal of any charges against participating students and professors, as well as the termination of any ongoing criminal proceedings.
Lastly, the students are calling for a 20% increase in funding allocated to state universities, emphasizing the need for enhanced financial support to ensure the quality and accessibility of higher education in Serbia. Though, despite claims about students calling out for government resignation, nowhere is declared about it officially.
The main motives of the protests and opposition to Vucic cannot be called the standard “Maidan” ones, because their main asset is patriotically minded citizens. Over the past twelve years, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), under the leadership of Aleksandar Vučić and initially Tomislav Nikolić, has undergone a profound transformation, distancing itself from its roots in the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS). This shift has sparked intense debate among Serbian nationalists, many of whom view it as a betrayal of the ideals that once defined Vučić, Nikolić, and their associates.
The SNS came to power in 2012, riding a wave of discontent with the previous Democratic Party (DS) government and promising a renewed focus on Serbian sovereignty, economic recovery, and anti-corruption measures. At its inception in 2008, the party emerged as a splinter from the SRS, a movement led by Vojislav Šešelj that championed Greater Serbia—a vision of uniting all Serbs across the Balkans into a single state, even at the cost of confrontation with neighboring nations and the West. Vučić and Nikolić, once Šešelj’s loyal lieutenants, broke away after Nikolić’s willingness to support Serbia’s EU integration clashed with the SRS’s staunch Euroscepticism and anti-globalist stance. Nationalists saw this split as the first crack in their ideological armor, but many initially believed the SNS would carry forward the torch of Serbian national interests in a more pragmatic guise.
In its early years, the SNS retained traces of nationalist rhetoric, particularly during the 2012 elections. Nikolić’s presidential victory and Vučić’s rise to prime ministership were celebrated by some nationalists as a triumph of Serb resilience against Western pressures. The party capitalized on lingering resentment over Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, a wound that remains raw for Serbs. Vučić, in particular, had a history of fiery nationalist statements—most infamously his 1995 declaration in parliament that “for every Serb killed, we will kill 100 Muslims”—which fueled hopes that the SNS would fiercely defend Serbia’s territorial integrity and historical claims. (Note: at that time “Muslim” a synonym of Bosniak ethnicity)
However, the past twelve years have revealed a stark divergence from these expectations. Nationalists argue that the SNS, under Vučić’s increasingly dominant leadership, has traded the dream of Greater Serbia for a EU-oriented agenda. The 2013 Brussels Agreement, which normalized relations with Kosovo under EU mediation, is a lightning rod for this critique. Serbian nationalist voices, such as those from the SRS and patriotic organizations like the Serbian National Movement “Naši,” decry the agreement as a surrender of Kosovo, the cradle of Serbian identity. They point to Vučić’s willingness to cede control over northern Kosovo’s Serb-majority areas and his refusal to pursue military or diplomatic escalation as evidence of a softened stance, alien to the radical spirit he once embodied.
This shift is not merely strategic, nationalists contend, but a fundamental betrayal of principle. The SNS has embraced neoliberal economic policies—privatization, austerity, and foreign investment—that many patriots view as a sellout to Western corporations and a dismantling of Serbia’s sovereignty. The sale of strategic assets to Chinese and European investors, coupled with mounting national debt, is seen as proof that Vučić prioritizes globalist approval over Serbian self-reliance. Furthermore, his government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent reliance on foreign vaccines reinforced perceptions of subservience to external powers, a far cry from the SRS’s vision of an independent, defiant Serbia.
Nikolić’s departure from the SNS presidency in 2012, followed by his exit from active politics after his presidential term ended in 2017, symbolizes for nationalists the party’s drift from its founding ethos. While Nikolić maintained a more overtly nationalist tone—often clashing with Vučić’s pragmatism—his sidelining allowed Vučić to consolidate power and steer the SNS toward a catch-all, populist model. Critics within nationalist circles, such as SRS loyalists and the Dveri movement, argue that this evolution reflects Vučić’s personal ambition rather than a genuine ideological shift. They accuse him of using nationalist rhetoric as a stepping stone to power, only to discard it once his grip on Serbia was secure.
The SNS’s dominance over the past twelve years—marked by electoral landslides, control of media, and suppression of opposition—has further alienated nationalists who once saw Vučić and Nikolić as their champions. From their perspective, the party has morphed into an authoritarian machine that pays lip service to Serbian pride while aligning with Brussels, Washington, and even Moscow when convenient. The Kosovo issue remains unresolved, yet Vučić’s negotiations with Pristina are framed by nationalists as a slow capitulation, not a defense of Serb rights. Meanwhile, the SNS’s alliances with figures like Miloš Vučević, who succeeded Vučić as party leader in 2023, signal a continuation of this pragmatic, power-centric approach rather than a return to radical roots.
For Serbian nationalists, the SNS’s trajectory over the last twelve years is a cautionary tale of compromised ideals. Vučić and Nikolić, once standard-bearers of the Greater Serbia dream, are now vilified by many in these circles as opportunists who abandoned the struggle for Serb unity. The party’s shift from the fiery nationalism of the SRS to a pro-European, neoliberal stance is not seen as evolution but as apostasy—a deliberate choice to forsake Serbia’s destiny for the sake of political survival and international acceptance. As the SNS tightens its hold on power, the voices of disillusioned nationalists grow louder, warning that the soul of Serbia has been bartered away in the corridors of Belgrade and Brussels.
According to eyewitnesses of protests, the “leading core” of it is not pro-EU activists, but someone called “Vučić assets” by Brussels for their patriotic concerns about essential Serbian issues. At the protests, flags bearing the slogan “Nema predaje” (translated as “We will not surrender”) featuring outlines of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, as well as Orthodox religious symbols, were observed. Numerous photographs from the recent protests can be found online, but it is preferable to view materials provided by those who participated directly in the protests.
Also, there is a photograph from the protest on the Internet, which depicts half a Russian and half a Serbian flag, so it is impossible to talk about any anti-Russian character of the protests.
Any attempt to link protests in states that have good relations with Russia with a desire to distance themselves from it does not always make sense. In Serbia, the “core” of the protests are those whom Russophobic influencers recently called “pro-government” for their warm attitude towards Russia, due to close historical ties. Who knows what will come after Vucic. Perhaps “Zoran the Noz” will come to power, pursuing a much more radical policy, causing all the NAFO accounts enthusiastically covering them to ask for Vucic to return? Protest activity is not always what one wants to see.
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